Kenya’s National Vote Tally Must Emerge from the Shadows

On this International Day of Democracy, Kenya should return to democracy’s most basic promise: the freely expressed will of the people must determine who governs.

Since our first multiparty election in 1992, we as citizens have been asked to queue and do our part. We register. We turn up. We often wait long hours in line. And we cast our ballots. Yet after votes are counted in communities across our country, we are told to trust what happens next at the national level. After everything we have seen in recent elections, that is not enough. Kenyans deserve to know what happens to every constituency result, who handles it, and whether anything is added or subtracted before the winner is declared.

Once the people have spoken, nobody should have the power to change their will.

That is why the first and most important reform before Kenya’s 2027 election is to end the National Tallying Centre’s power to reopen, alter, or override constituency results. The national process should be limited to transparently adding the 290 final constituency totals and declaring the winner. Nothing more.

This is because the simplest way to reduce opportunities for electoral manipulation is to reduce the number of places where anyone can interfere with the result. If votes are counted openly at polling stations and added at the constituency level, there is no good reason to move the entire election into one centralized location in Nairobi. Doing so concentrates enormous power in one place, in the hands of a few people, at the most sensitive moment in our country.

A better system is simpler: count votes where they are cast. Announce results where they are counted. Publish them for everyone to see. Then add the results from all 290 constituencies and declare the winner. The Court of Appeal emphasized in the 2017 Maina Kiai case that an election is won or lost at the polling station. Article 86 of our constitution requires a system that is accurate, verifiable, accountable, and transparent. Likewise, Article 138 does not create a national clearinghouse empowered to reopen, reverify, or override constituency results.

This is, of course, bigger than a legal argument. It is common sense. If people watch their votes being counted and hear the result announced publicly, that result should remain final. It should not enter an opaque process where constituency figures can be overridden beyond public view.

Decentralization makes interference harder and accountability easier. That should be our shared goal. If every constituency result is public, political parties, journalists, civil society, and ordinary Kenyans can tally the numbers themselves. Kenyans should not have to trust me, the government, the opposition, or any single institution to tell them what happened. They should be able to see it and verify the result for themselves. Transparency and credibility are paramount.

To be sure, ending the National Tallying Centre is a necessary reform, but it cannot stand alone. The register, the law, the technology, and the officials administering the vote must all uphold the same principle: results must be verifiable and beyond the reach of manipulation.

Clean up the voters’ roll. A credible count requires a credible register. The last independent audit took place a decade ago, and its recommendations have yet to be fully implemented. Before 2027, an independently selected, reputable auditor should examine the roll, table a public report in Parliament, and provide a meaningful 30-day inspection period so that deceased voters, duplicate entries, and unlawful registrations can be removed.

Make electoral crimes carry real consequences. Any official who alters an election result, withholds an announcement, or tampers with election technology should face a mandatory minimum five-year prison term, with no option of a fine. Any state officer who misuses public resources for partisan ends should be automatically disqualified.

Open the technology before it fails. The IEBC must publish its technology policy, deployment plan, and procurement specifications well before election day and subject them to public scrutiny. It should disclose source code and server architecture to political parties and run public, end-to-end simulations months in advance. No system should route presidential results through one national server or any other single point vulnerable to capture or corruption.

Recruit returning officers openly. Every County Election Manager and Returning Officer should be publicly vetted through an independent, multiparty process from shortlisting to appointment. Last-minute, unilateral replacements undermine public confidence precisely when credibility matters the most.

Today, I am in the political opposition. Tomorrow, someone else will be in my position. That is why we cannot design an election system to benefit whoever controls the government. On this International Day of Democracy, the principle is simple: an election is democratic only when the people’s vote is carried unchanged from the polling station to the final declaration.

We must end corruption and opacity and return the power to decide elections to where it truly belongs: with the Kenyan people. The final result must reflect their votes exactly—nothing added, nothing subtracted, and nothing decided in the shadows.

David Maraga (@dkmaraga) is the 14th Chief Justice of Kenya and former President of the Supreme Court of Kenya, serving from October 2016 until his retirement in 2021. He is now running for President of Kenya in the 2027 election under the United Green Movement Party.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of Vanguard Africa, the Vanguard Africa Foundation, or its staff.