On October 23 the U.S. Embassy issued an alert about an elevated risk of terror attacks against a wide range of targets in Nigeria’s capital city, Abuja. This followed a series of concerning security developments over the past year and highlights the growing level of instability in Nigeria – a challenge that may seriously undermine the prospects for a credible election in February 2023.
This indeed marks a critical inflection point for Nigerian democracy.
Today, the country is experiencing the highest levels of insecurity since a transition to democracy in 1999. According to data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), instances of conflict, political violence, and protests in 2021 marked the highest on record — and 2022 is on track to surpass those alarming figures.
States with high levels of conflict tend to fare worse at conducting credible elections. From 1997-2021, countries in Sub-Saharan Africa that held elections with 1,000 or more conflict related fatalities tended to have significantly lower scores for free and fair elections. Analysis by the Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) Project shows a correlation between countries experiencing high levels of conflict during elections and lower levels of electoral fairness.
Further analysis of ACLED data shows that violence directly related to elections has already claimed some sixty lives in Nigeria this year, almost double the number of election related fatalities that occurred in the same period prior to the 2019 elections. Election violence has generally taken the form of violent protests and clashes between rival political party supporters, including recent high profile incidents in Kaduna and Zamfara. There have also been attempted assassinations and targeted killings of electoral commission staff. The stage has thus been set for even more violence on Election Day and perhaps beyond.
Key Drivers of Insecurity
In Nigeria and elsewhere, insecurity undermines elections in several critical ways, starting with lowering voter turnout. Recent surveys show that confidence in security was the single most cited factor by Nigerian voters deciding whether to participate in the 2022 gubernatorial elections in Ekiti and Osun states. The 2019 elections saw the lowest voter turnout in two decades, which significantly undermined popular perceptions of credibility – a real and growing concern for 2023 elections.
The proliferation of informal security groups like Amotekun in the South West and Ebube Agu in the South East also pose challenges (as noted by the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute in a joint pre-election assessment conducted in July 2022). In a national election in which security forces are stretched thin, what role, if any, will informal security elements play in electoral security? Would such an arrangement leave electoral security open to manipulation by political actors and prove to be destabilizing?
High levels of internal displacement also threaten to undermine the upcoming elections. According to data from the United Nations, there are more than three million internally displaced persons (IDP) in Nigeria today, and at least six states with more than 100,000 IDPs. While the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) has released a general framework to address the challenges of voting for IDPs, a detailed plan for voting and systematic surveys of IDP camps have yet to be undertaken.
Insecurity threatens to compound the already immense logistical challenges presented by the 2023 elections, which will be the biggest election in African history. Almost 100 million voters are registered to participate and will take place in more than 175,000 polling units across 774 Local Government Areas in 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory. Logistical problems have plagued past Nigerian elections, and in 2019 forced a last-minute delay that fueled perceptions of malfeasance and likely reduced voter turnout.
A potential runoff could also heighten tensions and cause political violence. Under Nigeria’s modified two-round system, in the first round the winner must receive a majority of votes and over 25% of the votes in at least 24 states. Failing this, the candidate with the greatest number of votes, and the candidate with a majority of votes in the greatest number of states, advance to a second-round. While this has never occurred, it is now a real possibility with three viable candidates from three different regions on the ballot.
Tensions could be exacerbated if there is confusion around the timeline and management of a second-round election. While INEC issued some clarification on the requirements for a runoff, it has not stated what the timeline for a runoff election would be (and it’s not clearly laid out in the Nigerian Constitution).
There is a risk that the level of insecurity could prevent international election observers from deploying around the country. Election observers are a critical part of electoral integrity, ensuring transparency and independent monitoring of election efforts, as well as playing a role in deterring malpractice and violence.
The use of strategic election violence is an additional and particularly troubling prospect. There are areas where it is known how a given community is likely to vote, and agents from the opposing side may seek to change outcomes by shutting down “enemy strongholds.” This has happened repeatedly in certain neighborhoods of Lagos, for example.
The Path Forward
With little more than four months until Election Day, what steps should Nigerian authorities be taking to address these evident problems?
The reluctance of INEC and state security forces to apply the electoral offenses provisions of the 2022 Electoral Act – especially the provisions related to vote buying, which has occurred at egregious levels in recent gubernatorial elections – raises doubt about their willingness to enforce the full extent of the law. Security forces should heed calls to be proactive and transparent about the enforcement of the Electoral Act, including releasing data on the number of suspects arrested and charged for offenses during the recent Ekiti and Osun gubernatorial elections.
Nigerian citizens are entitled to vote without putting their lives at risk. There needs to be further clarification on how adequate security will be provided without reliance on local informal elements, especially in regions already beset by violence. Nigeria’s security forces should also identify in advance the areas that are particularly vulnerable to the use of strategic election violence, and take added measures to prevent this type of criminal disruption.
Arrangements for a smooth and orderly electoral process are key to avoiding popular uncertainty and heightened tensions. INEC leadership should begin preparing now for a potential runoff, and publicly clarify the timelines and regulations under which a runoff would be held. International observer organizations and diplomatic missions should also identify ways to ensure there is an adequate observer presence on Election Day, while mitigating against the security threats that such missions endure.
Nigeria faces a grave test of its democracy at a time of elevated instability. But this situation also presents an opportunity. Recent history has shown how elections can spiral out of control without safeguards in place, but also how thoughtful preparation can contain the forces of insecurity and safeguard the democratic process. As Nigeria faces an epidemic of insecurity, failure to take meaningful action at this time puts both its security and its democracy at risk.
Santiago Stocker is the Resident Program Director for Nigeria at the International Republican Institute and the Director of the joint IRI-NDI International Electoral Observation Mission
DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of Vanguard Africa, the Vanguard Africa Foundation, or its staff.